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The precise nature of the relationship between language and thought is an intriguing
and challenging area of inquiry for scientists across many disciplines. In the realm
of neuropsychology, research has investigated the inter-dependence of language and
thought by testing individuals with compromised language abilities and observing
whether performance in other cognitive domains is diminished. One group of such
individuals is patients with aphasia who have an impairment in speech and language
arising from a brain injury, such as a stroke. Our previous research has shown that
the degree of language impairment in these individuals is strongly associated with
the degree of impairment on complex reasoning tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Task (WCST) and Raven’s Matrices. In the current study, we present new data
from a large group of individuals with aphasia that show a dissociation in performance
between putatively non-verbal tasks on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)
that require differing degrees of reasoning (Picture Completion vs. Picture Arrangement
tasks). We also present an update and replication of our previous findings with the
WCST showing that individuals with the most profound core language deficits (i.e.,
impaired comprehension and disordered language output) are particularly impaired on
problem-solving tasks. In the second part of the paper, we present findings from a
neurologically intact individual known as “Chelsea” who was not exposed to language
due to an unaddressed hearing loss that was present since birth. At the age of 32,
she was fitted with hearing aids and exposed to spoken and signed language for the
first time, but she was only able to acquire a limited language capacity. Chelsea was
tested on a series of standardized neuropsychological measures, including reasoning
and problem-solving tasks. She was able to perform well on a number of visuospatial
tasks but was disproportionately impaired on tasks that required reasoning, such as
Raven’s Matrices and the WAIS Picture Arrangement task. Together, these findings
suggest that language supports complex reasoning, possibly due to the facilitative role
of verbal working memory and inner speech in higher mental processes.
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Introduction
To what extent is thought dependent on language? This question
has been pondered by philosophers and scientists alike for
millenia. When asked about the nature of thinking, Socrates
stated: “The soul when thinking appears to me to be just
talking” (Jowett, 1892, p. 252). Many individuals echo this
same subjective experience of an internal dialog that often
accompanies their thoughts (Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt and
Heavey, 2001; Carruthers, 2002), but how can we objectively
study the relationship between language and thought? A number
of eﬀorts to address this question experimentally have made
use of data from a range of sources, including animals, young
children, healthy adults, and language-impaired individuals
(Watson, 1920, 1924; Piaget, 1967; Kertesz and McCabe, 1975;
Vygotsky, 1978; Hjelmquist, 1989; Hurlburt, 1990; Halford et al.,
1998; Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999; Kinsbourne, 2000; Varley and
Siegal, 2000; Kuczaj and Hendry, 2003; Wheeler, 2004; Machery,
2005; Clark, 2006; Penn et al., 2008; Carpendale et al., 2009;
for a review, see Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). In the current
paper, we focus on the role that language plays in reasoning
and problem-solving in particular. First, we review prior work in
this area from a range of sources and then describe our current
research focused on studying the relationship between language
and reasoning in individuals with varying degrees of language
impairment.
Evidence from a number of animal studies clearly demonstrate
remarkable reasoning and problem-solving abilities in non-
human species (Blaisdell et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2009;
Smirnova et al., 2015), but it is argued that such abilities
have reached a higher level in humans (Premack, 1983, 2007;
O’Brien and Opie, 2002; Penn et al., 2008). Since abstract,
symbolic language reaches its apex in humans as well, it has
been suggested that these abilities are causally related, that is,
our language system facilitates logical reasoning in some way
(Sokolov, 1968/1972; Premack, 1983; Carruthers, 2002; O’Brien
and Opie, 2002; Bermudez, 2003; Gentner, 2003; Kuczaj and
Hendry, 2003; Goel and Dolan, 2004). Interestingly, it has
been shown that chimpanzees who receive language-training
have superior reasoning and problem-solving skills compared
to language-naïve chimpanzees (Premack, 1983), supporting
the notion that representational language facilitates advanced
reasoning.
Data from children also suggest that language plays an
important role in thought and reasoning (Behrend et al., 1989;
Gentner and Loewenstein, 2002; Gentner, 2003; Loewenstein
and Gentner, 2005; Lidstone et al., 2012). Vygotsky (1978,
2012) argued that young children ﬁrst use overt speech to work
through problems in conjunction with elders, then learn to
speak to themselves privately while working through problems
on their own, and eventually internalize that overt speech
into private, covert speech while problem-solving. Piaget also
believed that children’s private speech supported thinking and
was related to the development of reasoning ability (Piaget,
1926, 1967). Young children verbalize overtly when performing
cognitively demanding tasks, but by 14–17 years of age, children
report using an inner speech strategy (Winsler and Naglieri,
2003). Experimental evidence for these ideas comes from
studies showing that problem-solving performance in children
is associated with the use of private speech: Fernyhough and
Fradley (2005) showed that the use of self-regulating statements
in children correlated with performance on the Tower of London
puzzle task (see also Winsler et al., 2009). Similarly, it has
been shown that children exhibit increased self-directed and
private speech when performing a diﬃcult task and that children
who exhibit more self-directed speech are better able to solve
problems (Berk and Garvin, 1984; Berk, 1986; Behrend et al.,
1989; Winsler et al., 1997). Finally, others such as Hermer-
Vazquez et al. (1999) have shown that children’s ability to perform
a problem-solving task involving spatial orientation is related to
their level of language competence (but see Learmonth et al.,
2008).
Other work has approached the study of the relationship
between language and reasoning by assessing cognitive
functioning in individuals with varying degrees of language
impairment (Kinsbourne, 2000; Varley and Siegal, 2000).
A series of ﬁndings have shown that individuals with aphasia
(an impairment in language due to brain injury) show deﬁcits
in reasoning and problem-solving (e.g., Weinstein and Teuber,
1957; Piercy, 1964; De Renzi et al., 1966; Archibald et al., 1967;
Basso et al., 1973; Edwards et al., 1976; Borod et al., 1982;
Larrabee, 1986; Hjelmquist, 1989; Hamsher, 1991; Baldo et al.,
2005, 2010; but see Kinsbourne and Warrington, 1963; Basso
et al., 1973). Moreover, a large number of these studies have
shown that the degree of aphasia severity is correlated with the
level of cognitive impairment (De Renzi et al., 1966; Archibald
et al., 1967; Edwards et al., 1976; Borod et al., 1982; Larrabee,
1986; Vilkki, 1988; Baldo et al., 2005, 2010; but see Basso et al.,
1973; Helm-Estabrooks, 2002). In particular, individuals with
severe comprehension deﬁcits such as those with Wernicke’s
aphasia appear to be especially impaired on problem-solving and
reasoning tasks (Kertesz and McCabe, 1975; Hjelmquist, 1989;
Baldo et al., 2005), a ﬁnding not simply explained by a failure to
understand task instructions.
In our work, we have examined the role of language
in reasoning by comparing large groups of stroke patients
with and without aphasia on standardized tests of non-verbal
reasoning and problem-solving. Such tests require the ability
to recognize/represent a problem, use available information
to test possible solutions, and monitor the veracity of those
solutions. By “non-verbal,” we refer to the fact that these tasks
do not require a spoken response and have no/minimal language
comprehension requirements. For example, Baldo et al. (2005)
tested 41 right and left hemisphere stroke patients with a
wide range of aphasia severity on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST; Heaton et al., 1993) and showed that problem-
solving performance was signiﬁcantly related to the degree
of patients’ language impairment. Interestingly, performance
was most strongly related to patients’ comprehension scores
in particular, suggesting that core language processes are
most important for successful problem-solving. In an eﬀort
to establish discriminant validity (i.e., to show that the
relationship between language scores and performance on
the WCST was not simply a matter of overall cognitive
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impairment), we also showed that there was no relationship
between patients’ language scores and performance on Block
Design, a non-verbal test of visuospatial functioning that is
minimally dependent on reasoning. This dissociation reinforces
the idea that individuals with aphasia, particularly those with
core language impairments, have diﬃculty on tasks involving
reasoning that are not explained by a general cognitive
impairment.
Similarly, we have shown that aphasic individuals also
exhibit poor performance on another test of non-verbal
reasoning, Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Baldo et al.,
2010). Importantly, there was a signiﬁcant interaction in
performance on this test such that individuals with aphasia
were disproportionately impaired on Raven’s items that required
relational reasoning relative to those items that only required
visual-pattern completion (see Figure 1 for examples; Bunge
et al., 2005; Crone et al., 2009). Again, the speciﬁcity of these
ﬁndings bolster the conclusion that decrements in reasoning in
particular are associated with language impairment following
stroke, rather than such deﬁcits being part of a more general
cognitive impairment.
In the current paper, we sought to extend our previous
ﬁndings by testing the relationship between aphasia severity
and reasoning using a series of putatively non-verbal tasks
from a commonly administered instrument, the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Experiment 1A). We also sought to
replicate and extend our previous ﬁndings with the WCST in
a larger and more homogeneous patient sample that included
left hemisphere-injured patients only (Experiment 1B). Rather
than focus solely on aphasia subtypes, which can be problematic
due to the multi-dimensional nature of these syndromes
(Caramazza and McCloskey, 1988; Coltheart, 2004), we also
assessed the relationship between reasoning performance and
speciﬁc language sub-processes (e.g., auditory comprehension,
repetition). In the second part of this paper, we describe ﬁndings
from a unique individual whose language impairment derives
not from aphasia but from the fact that she was not exposed to
language until the age of 32 due to an unaddressed hearing loss
(Experiment 2). Together, these data provide further insights into
the close relationship between language and reasoning.
Experiment 1A: Reasoning Performance
in Aphasic Individuals on the WAIS
In a further eﬀort to understand the role of language in reasoning,
we conducted an analysis of aphasic patients’ performance
on the Picture Completion and Picture Arrangement subtests
of the WAIS-R and WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1981, 1997). These
standardized tasks were chosen for comparison because they
both require visual perception and attention with no/minimal
language or motor requirements, but diﬀer with respect to the
amount of reasoning required (Ryan and Paolo, 2001; Tulsky
et al., 2003). A previous study (Varley, 1998) used the Picture
Arrangement task as ameasure of causal reasoning in aphasia and
reported that one of the two aphasic individuals tested showed
impaired performance; however, there was concern that visual
impairments could have contributed to performance. Given these
equivocal results, it was of interest to compare performance on
the Picture Arrangement task to performance on the Picture
Completion task, which also involves visual perception and
attention but a smaller reasoning component. Also, we analyzed
performance from a large sample of well-characterized left
hemisphere patients with a range of language disturbance and
no known visual disturbance. Our prediction was that aphasic
individuals would be disproportionately impaired on the more
reasoning-intensive Picture Arrangement task, relative to Picture
Completion and that patients’ comprehension scores would be
most strongly correlated with performance.
Participants
A retrospective analysis was performed on data from 60
individuals (17 female) in our database who met strict
inclusion/exclusion criteria: history of a single left hemisphere
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the types of problems on Raven’s Matrices: (A) visual-pattern completion and (B) relational reasoning. These are not actual
items from the test due to copyright issues and to maintain test security.
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stroke, at least 6 months post-stroke (to ensure that behaviors
had stabilized), native English-speaking (by age 5), right-
handed, 8th grade education or higher, and no prior neurologic
or severe psychiatric history. The determination of language
impairment was made with the Western Aphasia Battery
(WAB; Kertesz, 1982, 2006), which also provides scores
for language sub-processes (ﬂuency, comprehension, naming,
etc.) as well as an aphasia subtype diagnosis (i.e., Broca’s,
Wernicke’s, conduction aphasia, etc.). Individuals that score
above the cut-oﬀ for normal language on the WAB (93.7 out
of 100 points possible) are considered non-aphasic according
to the WAB manual and norms. Based on this cut-oﬀ,
our sample included 37 individuals with aphasia and 23
non-aphasic individuals. The aphasic individuals included 17
individuals with anomic aphasia, nine with Broca’s aphasia,
ﬁve with conduction aphasia, ﬁve with Wernicke’s aphasia,
and one individual who was unclassiﬁable. Patients’ mean
age ± SD was 61.7 ± 11.0 years for the aphasic individuals
and 59.6 ± 10.9 years for non-aphasic individuals; mean
education was 14.6 ± 2.3 years for the aphasic individuals and
15.8 ± 3.0 years for non-aphasic individuals; mean months
post-stroke was 44.4 ± 46.9 months for aphasic individuals
and 41.7 ± 48.3 months for non-aphasic individuals; and mean
lesion volume was 136.1cc ± 71.6 for aphasic individuals and
31.5cc ± 29.0 for non-aphasic individuals. Finally, the aphasic
group included eight women and the non-aphasic group included
six women.
Materials and Procedures
Participants were administered the Picture Completion and
Picture Arrangement subtests from the WAIS-R or WAIS-III.
The Picture Completion task requires examinees to point to
something missing in a series of drawings of increasing diﬃculty
(e.g., a numbermissing from a keypad). The Picture Arrangement
task requires examinees to rearrange a series of pictures so
that they tell a story, like the tiles in a comic strip (e.g., a
series of pictures showing diﬀerent stages of people cooking a
meal). While both tasks require visuo-spatial perception and
attention, the Picture Arrangement task puts a greater burden
on reasoning ability (Varley, 1998; Tulsky et al., 2003). The tasks
were administered and scored in the standard manner according
to the WAIS manual. Because the data were collected over a
period of years, some participants were administered the Picture
Completion and Picture Arrangement subtests from the WAIS-
R and others, the WAIS-III. In order to combine data from
the WAIS-R and WAIS-III, scores were adjusted according to
Gläscher et al. (2009), which involved converting the WAIS-R
raw scores to WAIS-III raw scores by adding the mean diﬀerence
to each subtest (−0.4 for Picture Completion and −0.6 for
Picture Arrangement). Last, we also analyzed data from the
Benton Face Recognition Task (Benton et al., 1983) for these
60 individuals. The Benton Face Recognition Task is a visuo-
perceptual task in which examinees are asked to point to which
of six faces on the bottom of the page is the same person as
the face on top. Despite being called a face recognition task, it is
simply a face-matching task involving non-famous faces with no
delay.
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to compare
aphasic and non-aphasic individuals’ raw scores on the diﬀerent
tasks with age, years of education, months post-stroke, and lesion
volume included as covariates. Partial correlation coeﬃcients
(two-tailed) were computed to relate reasoning performance to
WAB subtest scores for speech ﬂuency, object naming, repetition,
and auditory comprehension, with the same nuisance factors as
control variables. The WAB ﬂuency score is a rating from 0
to 10 of an individual’s spontaneous speech based on ﬂuency
of speech, grammatical competence, and paraphasic errors; the
WAB naming subtest involves naming a series of 20 physically
presented items (e.g., ball, cup); the WAB repetition subtest
requires examinees to repeat 15 items that include single words,
phrases, and sentences; and the WAB auditory comprehension
score is based on yes/no questions, single-word recognition (both
physical object-word matching and picture-word matching), and
sequential commands.
Results
As predicted, the ANCOVA showed that aphasic individuals
performed signiﬁcantly poorer than non-aphasic individuals
on the Picture Arrangement task, F(1,54) = 6.25, p = 0.04
(M ± SD = 34.8 ± 21.7% vs. 60.8 ± 22.3%, respectively), but
the groups did not diﬀer statistically on the Picture Completion
task (49.0± 19.1% vs. 68.5± 14.6%, respectively), F(1,54)= 1.51,
p = 0.24 (see Figure 2), controlling for age, education, months
post-stroke, and lesion volume. Again, these results suggest that
language impairment is related to reduced performance on tasks
that place a greater demand on reasoning ability, even when
that task does not require any overt language production. As
in our previous work, the most severely language-compromised
individuals in the sample, those with Wernicke’s aphasia, had
the numerically lowest performance on the Picture Arrangement
FIGURE 2 | Performance of aphasic and non-aphasic stroke patients
on the WAIS Picture Completion and Picture Arrangement subtests,
and the Benton Face Recognition (Matching) Task. The raw data
(number of points attained on each task) were converted to a percentage of
total points possible for each task in order to compare the results across
tasks. Standard deviation bars are shown.
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(reasoning) task. In keeping with this result and similar to
our previous ﬁndings, partial correlations revealed signiﬁcant
relationships between scores on the Picture Arrangement task
and comprehension, r(58) = 0.27, p = 0.04, as well as repetition,
r(58) = 0.28, p = 0.03, but not with naming or ﬂuency
(ps > 0.05). The same pattern held true when we repeated
the partial correlation analyses with the sub-sample of aphasic
individuals only, with comprehension and repetition alone
showing marginally signiﬁcant correlations of 0.33 (p = 0.07)
and 0.32 (p = 0.08), respectively. With respect to normative cut-
oﬀs based on age-adjusted norms provided by the WAIS manual,
13.5% of the aphasic individuals performed in the signiﬁcantly
impaired range on the Picture Arrangement task (age-adjusted
scale score of 4 or lower) but only a single individual in the
non-aphasic subgroup. On the Picture Completion task, 18.9% of
aphasic individuals performed in the signiﬁcantly impaired range
and none of the non-aphasic individuals.
As can be seen in Figure 2, aphasic individuals exhibited
numerically (though not statistically) poorer performance than
non-aphasic individuals on the Picture Completion task as
well. For this reason, we additionally analyzed performance
from these same 60 individuals on another standardized test
of visuospatial functioning that does not involve reasoning, the
Benton Face Recognition Task. On this more purely visual-
perceptual task, aphasic and non-aphasic individuals performed
comparably as revealed by ANCOVA, F(1,54) = 0.72, p = 0.40
(M ± SD = 81 ± 9.4% vs. 84 ± 7.7%, respectively; see Figure 2).
These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that language
facilitates reasoning. Speciﬁc correlations between problem-
solving performance and comprehension and repetition further
suggest that core language processes (as opposed to output
processes such as ﬂuency and naming) are most strongly related
to performance. It should be emphasized that poor performance
cannot simply be explained by individuals with severe language
impairments misunderstanding the task, as they are able to
demonstrate their understanding of task instructions in the
initial trials, before it becomes more diﬃcult. In the Discussion,
we explore potential explanations of the observed relationship
between compromised core language and impaired reasoning as
they relate to the supportive role of inner speech and working
memory.
Experiment 1B: WCST Performance in
Individuals with Aphasia
We previously showed that performance on the WCST, a
standardized measure of problem-solving and reasoning, was
impaired in aphasic individuals and also correlated with a
number of critical language variables (Baldo et al., 2005).
However, our paper included a relatively small sample and a
heterogeneous group of both right and left hemisphere patients.
Therefore, we sought to replicate our previous ﬁndings in a
larger sample of patients whose lesions were restricted to the
left hemisphere, in order to conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings of a
relationship between language impairment and problem-solving
performance.
Participants
A retrospective data analysis was conducted on data from 81
chronic left hemisphere stroke patients from our database (23
female) who met the same strict inclusion/exclusion criteria
described above in Experiment 1A. Seventeen of these patients
were also included in Baldo et al. (2005). Based on the WAB,
35 patients were non-aphasic (i.e., scored within normal limits)
and 46 patients were aphasic. This latter group included 20
individuals with anomic aphasia, 12 with Broca’s aphasia, seven
with conduction aphasia, two with transcortical sensory aphasia,
and ﬁve with Wernicke’s aphasia. Patients’ mean age ± SD was
60.6± 11.6 years for the aphasic individuals and 60.5± 10.3 years
for non-aphasic individuals; mean education was 14.3± 2.7 years
for the aphasic individuals and 15.3 ± 2.8 years for non-aphasic
individuals; mean months post-stroke was 48.5 ± 50.5 months
for aphasic individuals and 44.7 ± 53.2 months for non-aphasic
individuals; and mean lesion volume was 126.2cc ± 67.1 in
aphasic individuals and 35.1cc± 43.6 in non-aphasic individuals.
Finally, the aphasic group included 12 women and the non-
aphasic group included 11 women.
Materials and Procedures
The WCST requires examinees to match test cards with diﬀerent
arrays of 1–4 items (e.g., two triangles) drawn in diﬀerent colors
to one of four key cards with similar arrays. Participants are not
told how to match the test cards to the key cards but are provided
with feedback from the examiner (correct or incorrect) after each
move. Unbeknownst to the examinee, the examiner repeatedly
changes the sorting category after a set number of trials, and the
examinee must recognize this switch and modify their sorting
behavior based on the feedback. As an indication of adequate
comprehension of task instructions, only a single individual with
Wernicke’s aphasia was unable to sort at least 1 category.
Aphasic and non-aphasic individuals’ raw scores were
compared with an ANCOVA using age, years of education,
months post-stroke, and lesion volume as covariates as above. In
addition, individuals’ praxis subtest scores from the WAB were
included as an extra covariate to ensure that poor performance
was not related to ideomotor apraxia (Basso et al., 1981; a subset
of 10 individuals in the sample scored below 80% correct on
the praxis subtest). Partial correlation coeﬃcients (two-tailed)
were computed with the same nuisance factors, in order to test
the relationship between problem-solving performance on the
WCST and language processes including speech ﬂuency, naming,
repetition, and auditory comprehension.
Results
Conﬁrming our 2005 ﬁndings, the left hemisphere stroke patients
with aphasia performed poorly on the WCST, completing an
average of just 2.6 out of 6 possible category sorts (SD = 2.1),
compared to non-aphasic left hemisphere stroke patients who
completed an average of 4.4 out of 6 category sorts (SD = 1.9).
An ANCOVA conﬁrmed that this diﬀerence was signiﬁcant,
F(1,64)= 4.16, p= 0.04, correcting for age, education, praxis, and
months post-onset. The size of patients’ lesions, another potential
confound, was available for 79 of the patients and did not change
the results when included as an additional covariate.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1523
Baldo et al. Reasoning in individuals with language impairment
As in our previous studies, aphasic individuals with the
most severe comprehension deﬁcits, those with Wernicke’s
and transcortical sensory aphasia, were particularly impaired
and were the only subgroups signiﬁcantly impaired relative
to the non-aphasic group, Dunnett’s T3 (equal variances not
assumed), ps < 0.001 (see Figure 3). As shown, individuals with
milder comprehension impairments (i.e., Broca’s, anomic, and
conduction aphasia) performed in the moderately impaired range
on the WCST task. Since aphasia subtypes can be problematic
as they are multi-determined syndromes, we also analyzed
WCST performance in relation to speciﬁc language subprocesses
as measured by the WAB, including speech ﬂuency, auditory
comprehension, repetition, and naming. Partial correlations
revealed that overall performance on the WCST based on the
number of categories sorted was signiﬁcantly related to auditory
comprehension alone, r(65)= 0.46, p< 0.001. The same was true
when the partial correlation analyses were repeated using data
from only the aphasic individuals rather than the entire sample:
only auditory comprehension signiﬁcantly correlated withWCST
performance, r(37) = 0.41, p = 0.01.
These new ﬁndings on the WCST reinforce our previous work
showing that many individuals with aphasia exhibit diﬃculties
on putatively non-verbal problem-solving tasks and thus suggest
a relationship between the presence of language deﬁcits and the
degree of impairment in problem-solving capacity. Furthermore,
individuals with the most severe language impairments (those
with transcortical sensory and Wernicke’s aphasia) performed
worse overall, and correlational data showed a signiﬁcant
relationship between comprehension scores and problem-solving
performance. These latter ﬁndings again suggest that core
language processes (as opposed to production processes such
as ﬂuency) are most signiﬁcantly related to problem-solving
performance.
FIGURE 3 | Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) performance is
shown for the number of categories completed, based on aphasia
subtype. Individuals with severe comprehension deficits (Wernicke’s and TC
Sensory aphasia) sorted the fewest number of categories on the WCST.
Performance in individuals with milder deficits overlapped with that of
non-aphasic individuals. TC Sensory, transcortical sensory aphasia. Standard
deviation bars are shown.
In short, we have conducted a series of large-scale studies
comparing reasoning/problem-solving in aphasic vs. non-aphasic
individuals that suggest a supportive role of language in
these abilities. Although concerns about potentially confounding
factors such as lesion size and overall cognitive impairment were
addressed, one could still argue that brain-injured individuals are
not the ideal population for addressing the issue of language and
cognition. Thus, we now turn to complementary data obtained
from a healthy adult with a severely restricted language capacity.
Experiment 2: Reasoning in a Deaf
Individual with Impaired Language
Another way to examine the role that language plays in
reasoning and problem-solving is by assessing cognition in
healthy individuals with compromised language abilities. This
can happen, for example, in deaf individuals who are not exposed
to language until they are older (Siegal et al., 2001; Morgan and
Kegl, 2006). One of the authors (ND) has worked with such
an individual (pseudonym “Chelsea”) who had an untreated,
congenital hearing loss and was not exposed to language or
any formal education until the age of 32. In Experiment 2,
we describe Chelsea’s performance on non-verbal measures of
reasoning in comparison to her performance on other cognitively
demanding tasks that do not involve reasoning. Data from this
unique individual parallel ﬁndings in aphasic individuals and
oﬀer additional insights into the role that language plays in
reasoning and problem-solving.
Participants
Data were collected from a single case whose pseudonym is
“Chelsea,” as well as her parents and two sisters who served
as controls. Chelsea was born with a severe to profound
sensorineural hearing loss that went unaddressed due to being
raised in a rural setting with limited resources (Dronkers,
1987; Glusker, 1987; Glusker et al., 1990; Curtiss, 2014). Her
mother had a viral illness while pregnant with Chelsea that is
associated with congenital deafness, but a deﬁnitive cause of her
sensorineural hearing loss was not established. She was raised
in a supportive home with her parents and six siblings, and
she functioned normally according to family report: carrying
out household chores, taking care of younger siblings, etc. As
an infant/toddler, she achieved all developmental milestones
at a normal rate and at a pace similar to her siblings (e.g.,
sitting, crawling, standing, walking, etc.), with the exception of
language. According to family report, there were no home-signs
used to communicate with Chelsea, but rather she relied on
pointing, gestures, andmiming to indicate her needs. Home visits
and videotapes of the family interacting with Chelsea (without
researchers present) conﬁrmed the apparent lack of any home-
signing system (see Curtiss, 2014).
At the age of 32, Chelsea was evaluated by a number of
medical providers and was ﬁtted with bilateral hearing aids that
allowed her to hear speech for the ﬁrst time. She started receiving
instruction in both spoken English and Signing Exact English by
a licensed speech pathologist. CT andMRI as well as EEG studies
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TABLE 1 | Examples of Chelsea’s spontaneous speech.
They are buy the grapes.
Two boy stand the play yard play.
That my birthday. 34 birthday.
They are is working house.
The frogs are the boy holding.
Working wine the couch the sit. Couch sit.
My birthday. The girl is blowing the [Chelsea] dinner ice cream.
conducted at the time were all normal. The neurologist who
evaluated her over several sessions reported that she showed no
evidence of neurologic disabilities except for a single neurologic
sign of mild hyperreﬂexia on the left side (Glusker et al., 1990 and
personal communication).
After being ﬁtted with bilateral hearing aids, Chelsea
gradually began acquiring spoken and receptive language, and
she achieved a good command of the English lexicon (i.e.,
production and comprehension of single words; Curtiss, 2014).
However, her ability to process syntax, both in production and
comprehension, was extremely limited. Not surprisingly, she
was diﬃcult to understand and converse with. Examples of
Chelsea’s spontaneous speech are provided inTable 1. In contrast,
she demonstrated relatively preserved pragmatics, including
normal body language, prosody, facial expressions, gesture, etc.
(Dronkers, 1987; Dronkers et al., 1998; Curtiss, 2014). Curtiss
(2014) concluded that Chelsea’s case provides clear evidence that
there exists a critical period for acquiring grammar but not for
acquiring other aspects of language such as the lexicon, which
continues to grow in Chelsea’s case.
Cognitive performance data from Chelsea’s parents and two
sisters are also reported here for comparison. Her mother and
father were tested at ages 52 and 62, and had 6th and 9th grade
educations, respectively.While not as restricted in their schooling
as Chelsea, her parents’ performance oﬀers an informative
comparison. Her two sisters were tested at ages 33 and 36, and
had 12 and 13 years of education, respectively.
Materials and Procedures
Chelsea was administered Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices
and the WAIS-R Performance subtests at several time points
from age 32–41. Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices includes
a series of 36 non-speeded trials in which examinees have to point
to 1 of 6 visual patches that best completes a visual pattern or
sequence. She was also administered the WAIS-R Performance
subtests, which represent the putatively non-verbal portion of
the WAIS and are the preferred means of assessing intellectual
functioning in hearing-impaired individuals (Braden, 1992). The
subtests include Picture Completion, Picture Arrangement, Block
Design, Object Assembly, and Digit-Symbol. As described above,
the WAIS-R Picture Completion task involves identifying a
missing object in a picture, and the Picture Arrangement task
involves rearranging a series of pictures so that they tell a story.
Block Design requires examinees to rearrange red and white
colored cubes to match a pattern printed in a stimulus book,
and performance is based on both speed and accuracy. Object
Assembly is a series of jigsaw puzzles that begin with very simple
ones and get progressively harder. Last, the Digit-Symbol test
involves speeded writing of symbols that correspond to numbers
provided in a legend at the top of the page.
Serving as controls, Chelsea’s parents and two of her sisters
were also administered the WAIS-R and Raven’s Matrices at
a single time point that occurred between Chelsea’s 2nd and
3rd testing sessions. Her family was administered the Raven’s
Standard Progressive Matrices, a more advanced version for
adults whereas Chelsea was administered a simpler version, the
Raven’s Coloured Progessive Matrices, which is administered to
children. The data described below for all testing are presented as
percentiles based on age-corrected, published norms.
Results
Consistent with our ﬁndings in aphasic individuals, Chelsea
showed a large discrepancy in performance between the Picture
Completion and Picture Arrangement subtests of the WAIS-
R. This discrepancy is even more striking in Chelsea than
in the aphasic individuals: her performance on the Picture
Completion task ranged from the average to high average range
across ﬁve diﬀerent administrations, while her performance on
the Picture Arrangement task was consistently in the impaired
range (based on age-adjusted WAIS-R norms; see Figure 4).
Importantly, she was able to solve the ﬁrst item on the Picture
Arrangement task, indicating that she understood the task
instructions. Furthermore, her poor performance on the Picture
Arrangement task was not explained by exceeding time limits on
the task, as she rearranged the cards (incorrectly) with time to
spare. In contrast to Chelsea’s performance, her parents’ and two
sisters’ scores were all in the average to high average range on both
of these tasks.
Chelsea performed in the average to high average range on
two other non-verbal WAIS-R subtests that are less dependent on
reasoning, Block Design and Object Assembly. Like the Picture
Arrangement and Completion tasks, these subtests also require
visual perceptual processing and attention as well as a manual
response. On the other non-verbal subtest of the WAIS-R, the
Digit-Symbol test, Chelsea initially performed in the impaired
FIGURE 4 | Chelsea’s discrepant performance on the WAIS-R Picture
Completion vs. Picture Arrangement tasks across several different
testing sessions.
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FIGURE 5 | Chelsea’s performance on Raven’s Coloured Progressive
Matrices at four different time points (normed percentiles ranged from
<0.01 -9th percentile) and her family’s performance on a single
administration of Raven’s Standard Matrices. Note that Chelsea’s scores
on the first two administrations are difficult to see since they approach the
x-axis at 0. The normal cut-off at the 10th percentile is shown.
range as it requires speeded writing with a pencil, to which
she was not accustomed, but by the last administration, she
performed in the average range. This striking contrast in Chelsea’s
performance across WAIS-R subtests lends further support
to the idea that language competence is related to reasoning
performance; if Chelsea’s poor performance were due to her lack
of formal education or some other general cognitive impairment,
one would expect to see consistently impaired performance
across all WAIS subtests.
Chelsea was also tested on the Raven’s Coloured Progressive
Matrices at four diﬀerent time-points. Similar to ﬁndings in the
aphasic individuals described above, Chelsea performed in the
impaired range on this test. Figure 5 shows her performance in
relation to that of her two sisters and parents who all performed
in the normal range based on normative percentiles. Importantly,
just as with our ﬁndings in aphasic individuals described above,
Chelsea showed a dissociation across diﬀerent types of Raven’s
items, correctly solving 100% of items requiring visual-pattern
completion but only 20% of those requiring relational reasoning.
In summary, Chelsea, a congenitally deaf individual with
poor language skills, showed disproportionately impaired
performance on standardized neuropsychological tasks that
involved reasoning. Based on her pattern of performance as
well as a comparison with other family members who also had
limited educational backgrounds, we conclude that her impaired
reasoning skills may be in part due to her restricted language
abilities.
Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that there is a close relationship
between language competence and the ability to reason and
problem-solve. We have come to this conclusion based on our
own work and the work of others showing that individuals
with impaired language, particularly those with core language
deﬁcits (i.e., impaired comprehension and disordered language
output), exhibit diminished performance on tests of reasoning
and problem-solving (Piercy, 1964; De Renzi et al., 1966; Borod
et al., 1982; Larrabee, 1986; Hjelmquist, 1989; Hamsher, 1991;
Baldo et al., 2005, 2010). Speciﬁcally, we described data from
a series of studies in which we compared the performance of
aphasic (i.e., language-impaired) and non-aphasic stroke patients
on a variety of reasoning and problem-solving tasks, such as
the WCST and non-verbal subtests of the WAIS. In these
analyses, the aphasic group as a whole was disproportionately
impaired on reasoning tasks relative to the non-aphasic group,
but the two groups showed comparable performance on other
cognitively demanding tasks that did not involve reasoning.
In the second part of the paper, we described complementary
ﬁndings from a case of a healthy individual with delayed exposure
to language due to an unaddressed congenital deafness. She, too,
exhibited marked impairment on tasks of reasoning that stood
in stark contrast to her ability to perform in the average to high
average range on numerous cognitive tasks that did not involve
reasoning. Taken together, these data are highly suggestive of an
important role for language in reasoning and problem-solving.
Our ﬁndings in language-impaired individuals are consistent
with previous studies in non-human animals and children that
also suggest an association between language and reasoning.
With respect to animal research, studies have shown that
language-training in non-human primates facilitates problem-
solving performance (Premack, 1983, 2007). Thompson et al.
(1997) further showed that this facilitation is likely due to the
learned ability of these animals to associate a token with an
abstract relation, much like language provides us with words
that can singly represent other propositional knowledge. In
studies with children, it has been shown that the level of
language competence and the use of private speech are directly
related to problem-solving performance (Berk and Garvin, 1984;
Berk, 1986; Winsler et al., 1997; Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999;
Fernyhough and Fradley, 2005; Carpendale et al., 2009). Vygotsky
(1978, 2012) championed this idea that language plays a role in
children’s development of reasoning skills: initially overt speech
and dialoguing with elders is used to work through problems
and is later internalized and becomes covert or inner speech.
Before him, Piaget (1967) believed that language, while not
critical for most stages of development, did play a role in formal
operations when abstract reasoning emerges. In support of this
idea, performance on Piagetian tasks involving formal operations
is impaired in language-delayed individuals, while performance
on tasks involving concrete operations is relatively intact (Furth,
1966; Furth and Youniss, 1971; Twilling, 1984). This dissociation
between concrete and formal operations was also exhibited by
Chelsea, the deaf individual with language impairment described
above.
If we accept the idea that language facilitates problem-solving
and reasoning in some way, this still leaves the question: what
is the mechanism underlying this relationship? The answer to
this question remains elusive and was not the focus of our
investigations reported above, but a number of data points are
instructive. First, prior work from our group and others have
shown that articulatory suppression in healthy individuals (e.g.,
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vocalizing nonsense syllables or irrelevant speech while doing a
task) is disruptive to performance on reasoning/problem-solving
tasks, suggesting that some form of verbal mediation (e.g., talking
to oneself) facilitates reasoning and problem-solving (Hermer-
Vazquez et al., 1999; Baldo et al., 2005; Wallace et al., 2009;
Lidstone et al., 2010; but see Learmonth et al., 2008; Bek et al.,
2010; Forgeot d’Arc and Ramus, 2011). Importantly, control
conditions with non-verbal distraction (e.g., tapping a rhythm)
are much less disruptive, showing that the eﬀect is speciﬁc to
verbal disruption, not a general disruption of attention or some
other process. Furthermore, as in children, it has been shown
that when healthy adults think out loud on a reasoning task,
performance can improve (see Fox and Charness, 2010). Such
studies in healthy individuals provide a causal link between
language and reasoning.
In keeping with this idea, Sokolov (1968/1972) described
studies in which individuals doing mental arithmetic and
repeating words had recordable muscle activity in the articulators
(e.g., tongue, lips, etc.), suggesting that such inner speech is
literally that—covert vocalization. More recent studies measuring
muscular activity show incredible speciﬁcity: when participants
silently read the letter “P,” muscular activity was detected in their
lips and when they silently read the letter “T,” muscular activity
was detected in their tongue (McGuigan and Dollins, 1989; but
see discussion below regarding dissociations of covert and overt
speech). Sokolov concluded: “Inner speech emerges as a rather
intricate phenomenon, where thought and language are bound in
a single, indissoluble complex acting as the speech mechanism
of thinking” (p. 1; also see Clark, 2006). Similarly, Carruthers
(2002) echoes this notion: “Central cognition may also deploy
the resources of the language system to generate representations
of natural language sentences (in “inner speech”), which can
similarly be of use in a variety of conceptual reasoning tasks” (p.
658).
A more systematically studied concept that can be invoked to
explain the role of verbal mediation or inner speech is verbal
working memory (Baddeley and Logie, 1999; Baddeley, 2000;
Al-Namlah et al., 2006; Marvel and Desmond, 2012; Perrone-
Bertolotti et al., 2014). It may be that this mechanism underlies
successful problem-solving performance, as it provides a real-
time rehearsal and updating of relevant information that can
provide cognitive ﬂexibility on reasoning and problem-solving
tasks (Jonides, 2000; Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Carpendale
et al., 2009). Verbal working memorymay also facilitate problem-
solving/reasoning by focusing attention and supporting self-
cueing and self-monitoring (Clark, 2005; Unsworth and Engle,
2007; Forgeot d’Arc and Ramus, 2011). Verbal working memory,
as measured by tasks such as repetition, is impaired in many
aphasic individuals (Brown, 1975; Goodglass, 1992; Kohler et al.,
1998; Baldo et al., 2012), and we have shown that patients’
repetition scores correlate with the percent of perseverative errors
on the WCST and performance on Raven’s Matrices (Baldo et al.,
2005, 2010).
In our current ﬁndings described above, repetition
impairment, along with comprehension impairment, was related
to poor performance on the Picture Arrangement (reasoning)
task, although comprehension alone was most strongly related
to performance on the WCST. Moreover, we also found that
individuals with transcortical sensory aphasia (who have
impaired comprehension but relatively preserved repetition)
were greatly impaired in their reasoning performance, suggesting
that core language (rather than simple repetition) is most
strongly related to reasoning performance. By “core language,”
we refer to the ability to both formulate and comprehend
meaningful language. That is, while posterior patients with
Wernicke’s/transcortical sensory aphasia (and global aphasics
as well) are deﬁned in part based on their poor comprehension,
they also have a corresponding inability to produce meaningful
language. Presumably, this limited ability to produce meaningful,
overt language is paralleled by a limited ability to produce
meaningful inner speech, a supposition which has only just
recently begun to be tested more systematically (see Fama et al.,
2014; Hayward et al., 2014, discussed below). Our speculation
is that disordered inner speech is central to the reasoning
performance decrements we observe in many language-impaired
individuals. Such suppositions need to be explored in future
studies to assess the extent to which inner speech is disordered in
diﬀerent aphasic subgroups and demonstrate how this relates to
impaired reasoning (Kinsbourne, 2000).
Interesting insights on the role of inner speech in reasoning
come from Jill Bolte Taylor, the neuroanatomist who suﬀered
a left hemisphere stroke and later recounted her subjective
experiences (Taylor, 2008; Morin, 2009). Taylor describes a
striking loss of inner speech that accompanied her aphasia and
negatively impacted her ability to reason and think through
problems:
The most notable diﬀerence between my pre- and post-stroke
cognitive experience was the dramatic silence that had taken
residency inside my head. I just didn’t think in the same way.
Communication with the external world was out. Language with
linear processing was out. But thinking in pictures was in (pp.
75–76).
A similar parallel between overt and covert language loss in
aphasia has also been described in other case studies of severe
aphasia (Lecours and Joanette, 1980; Kertesz, 1988).
In contrast, individuals whose aphasia is more related to
production deﬁcits (e.g., Broca’s aphasia, anomic aphasia) appear
to retain some capacity to generate inner speech, which might
explain their residual reasoning ability. Although diﬃcult to
study, evidence for this capacity comes from two recent
studies that assessed inner speech and the tip-of-the-tongue
phenomenon in a group of aphasic individuals who had primarily
output production deﬁcits (Fama et al., 2014; Hayward et al.,
2014). In Fama et al. (2014), 82% of the aphasic individuals
reported hearing the words they wanted in their head but being
unable to articulate them. Both Fama et al. (2014) and Hayward
et al. (2014) reported anatomical and functional dissociations
that mirrored the patients’ self-reports, such as fMRI activity in
brain regions associated with phonological access (in left superior
temporal cortex) when patients had this subjective experience.
Single cases with such a dissociation between inner speech and
overt language capacity have also been reported (Lecours and
Joanette, 1980; Hanley and McDonnell, 1997).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1523
Baldo et al. Reasoning in individuals with language impairment
Findings from the current study stand in seeming contrast to a
handful of smaller case studies that have concluded that language
is not critical for reasoning. For example, Varley and Siegal
(2000) reported a case study of an individual with agrammatic
aphasia who was trained to understand and then pass a theory
of mind (perspective-taking) test. Another study by this group
(Bek et al., 2010) tested ﬁve individuals with aphasia on a
spatial-landmark conjunction task used previously to show the
reliance of such tasks on language (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999).
They found that language was not critical for performance,
but they also concluded that such tasks are likely “assisted by”
language (p. 656), consistent with our position. Last, Apperly
et al. (2006) showed that a severely aphasic individual was able
to pass ﬁrst- and second-order false belief (theory of mind)
tasks, again concluding that grammar is not a requisite for such
performance.
One likely explanation for diﬀering conclusions about the
role of language in reasoning between our work and others’ is
a diﬀerence in the types of patients investigated. What we refer
to as “severe aphasia” is a syndrome in which patients have core
language deﬁcits: they cannot generatemeaningful language, they
are far below chance on simple word-picture matching tasks, and
they have diﬃculty understanding simple sentences. In the case
studies described above, the use of the term “severe aphasia” refers
to primarily agrammatic patients who are well above chance on
basic language tasks such as single word-picture matching vs.
our severely aphasic patients who score in the very impaired
range on such tasks. Our studies also include individuals with
severe agrammatism, and these individuals do relatively well on
our reasoning tasks. We believe they do well because their core
language is less impaired and they may thus possess relatively
preserved inner speech (see discussion of overt vs. covert speech
above). In our opinion, the individuals who provide the best test
of the role of language in reasoning are patients with severe,
core language impairments who have an inability to generate
meaningful language (e.g., individuals with chronic Wernicke’s
aphasia) and who likely have disordered inner speech. These
types of patients are more rare (relative to agrammatic patients),
and it has taken many years to be able to analyze data from a
group of such individuals.
Another explanation for the diﬀerent conclusions reached by
previous case studies of language and reasoning is the types
of tasks employed. Most of these previous case studies focused
on theory of mind/perspective-taking tasks, whereas we have
focused on standardized neuropsychological tasks of reasoning
and problem-solving like the WCST. Interestingly, in Apperly
et al. (2006), the individual with severe aphasia who was able
to perform false belief tasks was greatly impaired on executive
functioning tests that included the WCST. Similarly, Varley
(1998) reported impaired performance on the WAIS Picture
Arrangement (reasoning) task in a ﬂuent aphasic patient who
was able to pass theory of mind tasks. These dissociations suggest
that the two types of tasks likely tap distinct functions. False-
belief tasks, including theory of mind, do not require the same
degree of planning, self-monitoring, and online processing as the
standardized neuropsychological tasks used to test reasoning and
problem-solving in our studies described above. It is perhaps for
this reason that performance on these latter types of tasks is more
strongly related to language ability.
At the same time, a number of other studies on theory of mind
in children and in delayed language learners have shown that
performance is related to language competence (de Villiers and
Pyers, 2002; Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Schick et al., 2007;
Pyers and Senghas, 2009; see de Villiers, 2007; Carpendale et al.,
2009 for reviews). In an interesting experimental paper, theory
of mind performance was shown to be disrupted in adults under
conditions of articulatory suppression (verbal shadowing) but not
tapping (Newton and de Villiers, 2007). However, there is debate
as to the precise nature of the role that language competence
plays in theory of mind tasks (de Villiers, 2007). Although we
have not collected data on theory of mind tasks with our aphasic
patients, our case study described above, Chelsea, was tested on
a spatial perspective-taking task that involved minimal verbal
instructions and required a simple pointing response. She was
able to understand the task and comply with instructions when
asked to point to the picture that matched the visual scene
in front of her. However, she failed when asked to point to
the picture that matched the scene in front of the examiner
(who sat to her side). Given her excellent spatial skills on tasks
such as the WAIS Block Design and Object Assembly subtests,
this poor performance was more likely due to her inability
to take another’s perspective but could also have been due to
her impaired language-understanding. A similar problem arises
when attempting to test aphasic individuals on theory of mind
tasks: the instructions themselves necessitate a minimal level of
language competence, even when the task is visually presented.
To the extent that a patient can understand the instructions on a
theory of mind task, even a visually presented one, likely indicates
that their language is not completely impaired. Indeed, it would
be impossible for us to successfully convey instructions for theory
of mind tasks to the severely aphasic individuals that were most
impaired on our reasoning tasks described above.
To ensure that we did not overlook any “exceptional”
cases in our large datasets, we inspected our data for single
individuals demonstrating a dissociation between core language
and reasoning, that is, individuals with a severe impairment in
comprehension/lexical-semantics such as those with Wernicke’s
aphasia who nonetheless showed preserved reasoning. On the
WCST problem-solving task, 70% of patients were able to sort
between 2 and 6 categories (out of a possible 6) and not a single
patient with severe language impairment was among this group.
All of the individuals with Wernicke’s or transcortical sensory
aphasia (i.e., patients with severe core language impairments)
sorted 0–1 categories. On the WAIS Picture Arrangement task, 9
of the top 10 performers were non-aphasic (within normal limits
on the WAB language battery), with the 10th patient being an
individual with mild anomic aphasia. There was one individual
with Wernicke’s aphasia who scored 70% correct on the task
(moderately impaired), and the other three individuals with
Wernicke’s aphasia were in the bottom 10 performers. In contrast,
many of the Broca’s/agrammatic individuals in our study were
able to perform well on both theWCST and Picture Arrangement
tasks (exceptions were those Broca’s/agrammatic individuals with
more severe comprehension deﬁcits), similar to the previous
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1523
Baldo et al. Reasoning in individuals with language impairment
case studies of agrammatic aphasia. Thus, we would concur
with previous studies suggesting an independence of grammar
and reasoning (e.g., Varley and Siegal, 2000), but suggest that
core language processes such as those most typically aﬀected
in Wernicke’s aphasia play an important role in reasoning. As
suggested above, further work is needed to further explore these
dissociations among diﬀerent aphasic subgroups.
It should be noted that we are not claiming here that
intelligence, or thought more generally, is necessarily dependent
on language (also see Carruthers, 2012). Rather, we restrict our
claims to higher-level reasoning/problem-solving, that is, the
kind of thought normally facilitated by verbal mediation or inner
speech (Sokolov, 1968/1972; Carruthers, 2002; Evans, 2008). This
distinction has been made by Evans (2008) who contrasts a
heuristic, quick and dirty system that “rapidly contextualize[s]
problems with prior knowledge and belief” vs. a slow and
serial system that is engaged during “conscious eﬀortful analytic
reasoning” (p. 261). He argues that the former is a non-verbal
system that we share with other animals, while the latter system
is dependent on language and is unique to humans.
Nor are we making the claim that language is absolutely
indispensable to reasoning—we have rather argued throughout
this paper that language can “facilitate” and is “supportive”
of higher-level reasoning capacity. Even Ratliﬀ and Newcombe
(2008) who were skeptical of the original Hermer-Vazquez et al.
(1999) shadowing study on reasoning and language reported that
the original ﬁndings hold up to a certain degree. They concluded
that, although language may not be “crucial” to reasoning, it is
“helpful.” Similarly, Forgeot d’Arc and Ramus (2011) showed
that verbal shadowing impaired performance overall on a non-
verbal task involving belief attribution but that performance was
still above chance. Although they felt their data supported the
idea that belief attribution is independent from language, they
also concluded that language acts as “an additional tool to keep
relevant information in short-term memory” (p. 984). Similarly,
Varley (2014) concluded that “language resources may often be
deployed to scaﬀold performance on a range of problems” by way
of supporting short- and long-term memory (p. 242). Again, this
is consistent with the idea that language can serve a facilitatory
role in online processes that support reasoning performance.
Finally, we are not suggesting that the use of inner speech
and language to support reasoning is somehow predetermined;
it is apparently a learned phenomenon (Vygotsky, 2012) that
can vary across individuals. Interesting cross-cultural research
has also shown that the use of inner speech, while facilitatory
for non-verbal reasoning in European–Americans (healthy
individuals), can be disruptive for non-verbal reasoning in East
Asian–American participants on particular tasks (Kim, 2002).
This ﬁnding makes the intriguing prediction that reasoning
performance in East Asian patients with aphasia would not show
a similar pattern of disruption as in our current study which
included predominantly European–American patients. We are
currently investigating this prediction with a cross-linguistic
study of aphasia in collaboration with colleagues in Taiwan. It
is likely that the degree to which language is invoked to support
reasoning within and across cultures depends on the type of task
involved (e.g., supportive strategies for particular tasks in one
culture may bemore visual-spatial while in another, more verbal).
More experimental work in this intriguing area of investigation is
clearly needed.
Brain imaging studies have also provided novel insights into
the relationship between language/inner speech and cognition
(for a review, see Girbau, 2007; Morin and Hamper, 2012).
Consistent with our ﬁndings, Pillay et al. (2014) found that
posterior brain regions overlapping with Wernicke’s area,
including the left posterior superior temporal gyrus and inferior
parietal cortex, were most closely related to pre-articulatory
phonological access (what they and others have used as a stand-
in for inner speech). However, some recent functional imaging
studies in healthy individuals have suggested that language areas
can dissociate from higher-level cognitive processes (Monti et al.,
2007; Willems et al., 2010; Fedorenko et al., 2011). In our work,
we have shown that lesions involving language areas in the left
hemisphere (most consistently, left posterior temporal cortex)
are associated with decreased performance on reasoning and
problem-solving tasks (Baldo et al., 2005, 2010). In Baldo et al.
(2010), we found a dissociation between brain regions associated
with performance on the visual-pattern completion items on
Raven’s Matrices vs. performance on the relational reasoning
items: the former was associated with visual association regions
in left inferior temporo-occipital cortex and the latter, with
left posterior middle and superior temporal cortex (a critical
language zone). Still, caution is warranted in drawing strong
conclusions from lesion data as there is also the possibility
that distinct but overlapping networks underlie language and
reasoning processes in the brain (Kertesz, 1988; Baldo et al.,
2010).
In short, a range of philosophical inquiries and experimental
evidence supports the idea that language and reasoning are
highly inter-dependent. Further experimental investigations of
this relationship are needed in order to establish more evidence
for a causal role of language in reasoning (Varley, 2014), especially
with respect to the putative role that inner speech plays as
a mediating mechanism. We conclude here with an elegant
description by O’Brien and Opie (2002) of the relationship
between language and cognition:
Natural language thereby becomes a powerful cognitive tool. . .
one that can regulate the sequencing of thought, via the constant
interplay between networks that encode linguistic signals and those
that encode thoughts. . . Such causal loops catch up language and
thought in a tight web of mutual inﬂuence that extends our cognitive
capacities well beyond those of infra-verbal organisms (p. 327).
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